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Marine mammals and sea turtles in the United States are protected from commercial
fishery interactions under the Marine Mammal Protection Act and the Endangered
Species Act. To reduce harbor porpoise bycatch in the northeast sink gillnet fishery,
fishermen are mandated to attach pingers to their nets in regulated areas. Although,
pinger regulations have been in place for over a decade, in practice, enforcement is
weak and the penalty for a violation is almost non-existent. In this scenario, the presence
of normative factors may motivate a fisherman to comply with the pinger regulation.
This study considers both economic and normative factors within a probit framework
to explain a fisherman’s compliance decision. Model results indicate fishermen who
previously violated pinger regulations, who are not completely dependent on gillnet gear
and face a lower chance of being detected by an observer, are more likely to violate.
Understanding the influence of normative factors on compliance decisions is a key
component for higher compliance. That is, incorporation of these factors in the design
of policy instruments may achieve higher compliance rates and thus more success in
protecting these species. Our model findings were ground-truthed by conducting focus
group research with fishermen using pingers; some preliminary findings are shared in the
discussion in support of our model results. Finally, these results also suggest observer
data can be used to support compliance and enforcement mechanisms in this fishery
and possibly other fisheries as well.
Keywords: non-compliance, fisheries, normative factors, law enforcement, observer effect, U.S. endangered
species, marine mammals
INTRODUCTION
Non-compliance with regulatory requirements can derail resource management objectives.
Biological assessments used to monitor the health of a stock can trigger management responses
and regulatory actions when stocks are in danger of over-fishing. Inmost cases, fisheries andmarine
mammal management rely on regulatory instruments such as a command-and-control approach,
in the form of fishing effort reductions and gear standards to protect the stock. Regulatory
instruments direct individuals how to behave; while economic instruments, market based, can
be designed with incentives to influence an individual’s behavior, to achieve the same desired
goal. Therefore, choosing a policy instrument is a strategic choice. Resource managers can use
any combination of instruments, however, if goals are not met, non-compliance may be the
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source of failure and not the policy instrument itself; additional
policy instruments may not rectify the problem and cause further
economic harm.Hence understanding the underlyingmotivation
of behavioral responses to regulations is crucial and may allow
us to design more successful policy instruments. In this paper,
we examine economic and normative factors that may motivate
compliance behavior in the sink gillnet fishery in relation to
required gear standards in order to protect porpoise under the
United States (U.S.) Marine Mammal Protection Act (MMPA) of
1972 (16 U.S.C. 1361 et seq.).
The MMPA established a long-term regime for governing
interactions between marine mammals and commercial
fishing operations; the potential biological removal (PBR)
control rule enacted under the MMPA Amendments
of 1994, specifies the allowable level of human-induced
mortality for a marine mammal stock (MMPA 1972,
section 1386). In the northeastern United States (US), the
National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) is primarily
responsible for protecting populations of harbor porpoise
(Phocoena phocoena), northern right whales (Eubalaena
glacialis), coastal bottlenose dolphins (Tursiops truncates),
and loggerhead sea turtles (Caretta caretta) via the MMPA
and Endangered Species Act (ESA) of 1973 (16 U.S.C. 1531)
(Resolve, 1996; NMFS, 2002, 2005; NOAA, 2006a,b,c). One
of the major threats to their survival is lethal injuries from
interactions with commercial fishing gear, including sink
gillnet gear.
Most policy instruments the National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) has implemented to
protect marine mammals under its authorities have been a
“command and control” approach. In general, time and/or area
closures reduce or shift fishing effort out of a high bycatch area
by prohibiting fishing completely; gear standards reduce the
bycatch rate and allow vessels to continue fishing. While closures
can be monitored remotely (e.g., electronic vessel monitoring
systems) or by patrolling the area, monitoring gear compliance
involves hauling gear at-sea for inspection; it can be more labor
intensive and thus costly.1 Consequently, in terms of compliance
detection (e.g., monitoring) and cost, a closure may be the
preferred policy instrument for the regulator while the individual
being regulated may prefer gear modifications since they can
continue fishing in the proposed closed area.
In 2007, harbor porpoise bycatch exceeded PBR (U.S.
Department of Commerce, 2010) and based on the statutory
requirements contained in Section 118 of the MMPA, NMFS was
required to take action. Closures and acoustical devices (pingers),
a gear standard, were the two primary policy instruments chosen
to reduce the harbor porpoise bycatch in the northeast sink gillnet
fishery to levels below PBR under the 1999 Harbor Porpoise
Take Reduction Plan (HPTRP). Non-compliance with pinger
regulations was as high as 65%, from 1999 to 2007, in some
regulated areas in the northeast, based on data collected in the
1A dock-side gear inspection program is a lower cost alternative, however, the
effectiveness of monitoring compliance may be species dependent; while a vessel
may pass a dock-inspection for Turtle Excluder Devices or pingers, that does not
enforce proper use at sea. http://www.greateratlantic.fisheries.noaa.gov/protected/
porptrp/ptci.html
Northeast Fisheries Observer Program (NEFOP) (Palka et al.,
2009).
Regulators often rely on strict enforcement and penalties to
achieve high levels of compliance. An individual will violate
a regulation if the expected illegal gain exceeds the penalty,
which is a function of the size of the fine for non-compliant
behavior and the detection rate of a violation (Becker, 1968).
Sutinen and Anderson’s (1985) seminal conceptual work on
law enforcement was followed with empirical papers confirming
Becker’s original hypothesis (Sutinen and Gauvin, 1989; Bean,
1990; Sutinen et al., 1990; Furlong, 1991; Kuperan and Sutinen,
1998; Hatcher andGordon, 2005; Shaw, 2005), demonstrating the
economic gain often outweighs the penalty. King and Sutinen’s
(2010) survey of the northeast United States groundfish fleet
indicate the deterrence effect of the existing enforcement system
is weak; violations had a 32.5% probability of being detected, and
if detected, a 33.1% chance of being prosecuted and resulting in
a penalty. Economic gains from violating fishing regulations are
nearly five times the economic value of expected penalties. The
incentive to not comply is high.
Sink gillnet vessels, members of the northeast groundfish
fleet may find it more practical to take the risk of receiving an
unintentional first offense of $200 (NOAA, 2014) vs. purchasing
pingers; what’s more, the maximum statutory penalty for a
MMPA violation is equivalent to the initial cost of pingers,
$8000 (NMFS, 2009). Thus, the likelihood of a pinger violation
leading to an arrest, prosecution and a fine is extremely low.
However, evidence in various fisheries indicates the majority of
fishermen seemed to comply even when the expected illegal gain
did exceed the penalty (Kuperan and Sutinen, 1998; Sutinen
and Kuperan, 1999). Normative influences may motivate an
individual to comply. That is, social norms (obligatory, shared or
forbidden behaviors) mediate the way in which people in society
behave (Ostrom, 1990, 2000; Wiber et al., 2004). Moral, ethical,
legitimacy, and social influences can induce an individual to
comply even when the economic incentives for non-compliance
are high.
Sutinen and Kuperan (1999) extended Becker’s crime model;
they developed a theoretical framework which adopts work by
Adam Smith (1759) that explicitly portrays human economic
motivation as being multidimensional, arguing the psychic well-
being is based on acting morally and receiving the approval
of others, as well as enhancing wealth. Kuperan and Sutinen’s
empirical work (1998) found that compliance in a Malaysian
fishery depended on the tangible gains and losses, as well
as the moral development, legitimacy, and behavior of others
in the fishery (Sutinen et al., 1990). Hatcher et al. (2000)
made a similar conclusion in regard to fishermen’s compliance
with quota in the United Kingdom fisheries; a significant
positive relationship between perceptions of fairness and levels
of compliance was reported though a follow up study confirmed
the deterrence effect but found less evidence of normative factors
influencing compliance (Hatcher and Gordon, 2005). Similarly,
Keane et al. (2008), Nielsen (2003), and Nielsen and Mathiesen
(2003), communicated how normative factors (e.g., legitimacy
of the imposed regulations) influences individual’s compliance
decisions while Eggert and Lokina (2008) showed the importance
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of normative variables in addition to deterrence variables in
explaining compliance behavior of the Tanzanian Lake Victoria
fishers. A deterrent, which in practice usually means greater
enforcement, is not the only way to improve compliance. Sutinen
(2010) argues policy makers should pay more attention to
the institutional design to strengthen perceived fairness and
legitimacy of the management process.
Normative influences may motivate a fishermen to comply
with protected species regulations. The existence of laws and
policies such as the MMPA and ESA, imply society values these
animals. According to Lavigne et al. (1999), North American
attitudes toward marine mammals have in many respects
paralleled the evolution of attitudes toward the environment,
endangered species and wilderness (Richardson and Loomis,
2009; Wallmo and Lew, 2012). Marine mammals are part of
a healthy marine ecosystem and may factor into a fishermen’s
livelihood. There is an inherent incentive for fishermen to protect
their income; fisheries regulations directly impact their day to
day earning decision. In a 2012 meeting of fishermen discussing
pinger compliance, similar values were echoed: “All I know is in
this room there is not a guy in here that wants to hurt a porpoise
or whale” (Appendix in Supplementary Material, comment 1).
Hence, normative factors may explain compliance decisions with
harbor porpoise pinger regulations in the presence of economic
incentives to not comply.
We develop a behavioral model which incorporates deterrent
(e.g., perception of detection), economic and normative factors
(e.g., moral, legitimacy, and social influences) to investigate
compliance decisions. Specifically, the compliance behavior of
fishermen in the northeast sink gillnet fishery under the 1999
TRP with regard to pinger compliance is examined from
2007 to 2010. Proxy variables are developed from NMFS
observer data, NEFOP, to model normative factors. Potential
biases with observer data were identified as a concern because
forewarned captains may fix problems before the observed
trip; however, we are not measuring compliance rates but
instead attempting to understand compliance behavior. Our
model findings were ground-truthed by conducting focus group
research with fishermen using pingers; some preliminary findings
are shared in the discussion in support of our model results.
The percentage of outcomes correctly predicted is 92% based on
model estimates. Our results also suggest observer data such as
the NEFOP can be used to support compliance and enforcement
mechanisms in this fishery, though this is likely applicable
to other fishery compliance problems as well. The intent of
this study is to identify the importance of understanding and
including normative and economic factors that may influence
fishermen’s compliance decisions, in order to design effective
regulations to protect harbor porpoise.
BACKGROUND
Gillnet Fishery
Sink gillnet gears are used by vessels targeting commercially
sought species such as, cod (Gauds morgue), spiny dogfish
(Squalls acanthi as), pollock (Pollachius virens), goosefish
(Lophius americanus), and flounder (Pleuronectiform). These
vessels operate from Maine to North Carolina. The mix of
species landed varies by season and area. In season-areas where
groundfish landings, such as cod, pollock, flounder and goosefish
are prevalent, dogfish landings are generally absent. Typically,
gillnet vessels leave their ports in the early hours of the morning,
haul their catches, reset their gears, and return to port the same
day. A vessel usually hauls four to eight strings of gear per
trip, where one string is around 3000 feet in length. Gear is set
in the water to soak for 24–72 h, after which it is hauled and
reset. During the long soaking period of gillnets, harbor porpoise
(Phocoena phocoena) become entangled in the gear and suffocate.
Harbor Porpoise Management
During the last 25 years there have been cycles with harbor
porpoise bycatch above or below PBR (Waring et al., 2012).
The MMPA indicates that when the 5-year average annual
bycatch estimate is greater than PBR (Wade and Angliss, 1997),
the following process is initiated to reduce bycatch. First, the
stock is designated “Strategic,” which requires convening a Take
Reduction Team (TRT). The TRT has 6 months to develop a
plan that will reduce bycatch below PBR within 6 months of
implementation of the plan, with a long-term goal of reducing
bycatch to an insignificant level approaching zero. The HPTRP
implemented the pinger requirement on 1st January 1999 (63
Federal Register 66464, 2 December 1998) after the 1994-1998
average bycatch rate exceeded PBR.
In December 2007, NMFS reconvened the team to consider
additional modifications to the HPTRP to reduce harbor
porpoise bycatch in New England and Mid-Atlantic gillnet
fisheries to levels below the stock’s PBR and approaching
ZMRG. High non-compliance rates with pinger regulations was
one of the reasons bycatch levels exceeded PBR. Enforcement
presence was lacking. Since 2012, two pinger violation cases have
been prosecuted by NOAA’s Office of General Council in the
northeast. A $4000 fine was issued in 2014 to a vessel found
in “contravention of applicable regulations designed to prevent
harbor porpoise from interacting with fishing gear” (NOAA,
2015); and in 2012, a written warning was issued to another vessel
for “fishing in the closed offshore area without pingers” (NOAA,
2013).
The focus of this study is the 2010 fishing year (June 2009–
May 2010), when gillnet vessels were operating under that 1998
HPTRP plan (NMFS, 1998). According to this plan, vessels
could continue fishing if they attach pingers to their gear in the
following areas: the Mid-Coast, Mass Bay, Offshore and Cape
Cod South Area, north of 40◦N (Figure 1).
METHODOLOGY
Conceptual Framework
Although pingers regulations are in effect for over a decade, a
systematic way to monitor compliance does not exist. Under
the current institutional structure, researchers detect and assess
pinger violations via NMFS’s NEFOP. In general, violations are
recorded by NEFOP observers; however, observers do not report
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FIGURE 1 | 1998 Harbor porpoise TRT management areas in the northeast (NMFS, 2009).
to enforcement2. As a consequence, the likelihood of an observed
violation leading to punishment is rare. Moreover, a common
belief among fishermen is pingers adversely impact catch and
thus revenue; pingers are known to act as dinner bells for harbor
seals that eat the warm bellies of cod caught in the gear (Bisack
and Clay, 2012). Although there has been no experiment to study
the impact of pingers on catch since 1997 (Kraus et al., 1997),
the 2007–2010 NMFS observer data show significant differences
in cod and pollock catch rates between strings with 100% and
zero pingers present [p = 0.0040 (equal variance) or p = 0.0159
(unequal variance)]3. An average gillnet trip (8 strings with 10
nets per string soaking for 24 h) fishing with pingers could incur
2NOAA’s Office of Law Enforcement (OLE) has requested this information from
NMFS, yet only two cases have been prosecuted between 2012 and 2014.
3NMFS observed hauls targeting cod (Gadus morhua) and pollock (Pollachius
virens) had a mean catch rate of 2.38 pounds of fish per net soak hour (n = 749,
a revenue loss on average of $1535 per trip (= 1190 pounds
less cod and Pollock ∗$ 1.29 per pound). With the potential
perception that the economic benefit of compliance is lower than
non-compliance and a low likelihood of a fine being issued, the
economic incentive for non-compliance is assumed to be high.
Under this environment, a fisherman’s compliance behavior may
be explained by normative influences.
We consider three broad types of normative variables:
individuals’ moral values, social influences and their perceived
legitimacy of the regulations. We hypothesize that a fishermen’s
attitude toward compliance can differ due to differences in their
moral standards. An individual’s behaviors are often motivated
by their personal moral values (Frank, 1996; Nielsen, 2003;
Nielsen and Mathiesen, 2003). That is, an individual concerned
std= 0.098) while hauls with zero pingers had a mean catch rate of 3.00 pounds of
fish per net soak hour (n = 316, std = 0.238).
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with the principles of right and wrong behavior, may feel
obligated to obey the law, and thus gain a greater sense of
satisfaction by behaving an honorable way.
Social interactions can also influence an individual’s attitude
toward compliance. A person is likely to be more non-
compliant the more his community and peer groups are non-
compliant (Vogel, 1974; Geerken and Gove, 1975; Witte and
Woodbury, 1985; Robinson and O’Leary-Kelly, 1998; Beams
et al., 2003). O’Fallon and Butterfield (2012) explain the
occurrence of unethical behavior through three different theories:
social learning (i.e., “I behaved unethically because I observed
my peers doing it and being rewarded for it”), social identity
(i.e., “I behaved unethically because unethical behavior is the
social norm”), and social comparison theory (“If I do not engage
in unethical behavior, I will fall behind my peers”). There are
many reasons a person may be persuaded to make a decision
in a particular direction; formal unions are a peer pressure
mechanism for example. However, peer pressure may or may
not make a difference since it is just one of several factors
to consider.
The legitimacy of regulations can also impact an individual’s
decision to comply. Their perception of the problem and solution
can impact their compliance decision; they may question the
need for protection and whether the solution works (e.g., whether
pingers repel porpoise). The literature on local management or
co-management approach to fisheries governance suggests that a
greater involvement of fishermen in themanagement process will
lead to increased levels of compliance because regulations will
then be accorded greater legitimacy. To be precise, participation
by fishers in the management process is considered by many
as “essential” for achieving more sustainable, equitable, and
efficient management outcomes (Ostrom, 1990; McCay and
Jentoft, 1995; Pinto da Silva and Kitts, 2006; Rountree et al.,
2008; Yochum et al., 2011). We tend to support solutions with
greater satisfaction if we participate in the development of the
solution.
Many factors contribute to an individual’s personal decision
on an issue. The objective of this study is to analyze the
influence of these economic and normative factors, in addition
to deterrents and a set of vessel characteristics, on an individual’s
compliance behavior. A formal model of the decision process is
given below.
Model Specification
A binary choice modeling framework is used to explain
a fisherman’s compliance behavior. We assume a fisherman
will decide to violate the pinger regulation if their expected
utility from non-compliance exceeds the expected utility from
compliance. In this scenario, the difference in the expected
utilities of the individual is modeled as follows:
y∗i = β
′xi + εi
Where, x represents a vector of variables that effect a fisherman’s
compliance decision, β is the vector of unknown parameters
and εi is the error term. In practice, we do not observe utilities,
or y∗i . What we observe instead is the binary choice variable
Vi, which indicates whether a violation has occurred or not.
The relationship between y∗i and Vi can then be defined as
follows:
Vi = 1 if yi
∗ > 0
Vi = 0 otherwise.
The probability of violation is written as:
Prob (Vi = 1) = Prob
(
εi > −β
′xi
)
= F(β ′xi)
Where F is the cumulative distribution function of ε. If we assume
ε is independent and an identically distributed standard normal,
we obtain a probit model which can be expressed as:
Prob (Vi = 1) = 8(β
′xi)
Where, 8(.) is a standard normal distribution function. The
parameters of this binary probit model are estimated via a
maximum likelihood method. In a probit model, the estimated
coefficients cannot be interpreted as marginal effects; rather they
are calculated as follows (Greene, 2000):
∂E[v|xi]
∂xi
= ϕ(β ′xi)β
The dependent variable, violation V i is equal to 1 if vessel i
violated the pinger regulations under the 1998 HPTRP plan at
least once in the 2010 fishing year (May 2009–April 2010). A
gillnet haul was considered in violation of the pinger regulation if
the vessel did not have the correct number of pingers attached to
the gillnet gear (Palka et al., 2009).
Our independent variable vector x, includes a set of
vessel characteristics, deterrence and normative variables.
Characteristic variables consisted of a vessel’s registered gross
tons (GT), the ratio between the engine horsepower to vessel
length representing the vessel’s capital stock (HPLEN), the
number of years the captain has been fishing with gillnet gear
(CYRS) and gross revenues (GREV) the vessel earned within the
last year. We assume the expected fine is less of a deterrent to
high earning vessels and test whether the probability of violating
pinger regulations is related to high earning revenue vessels.
We also examine whether vessels fished gillnet gear exclusively
within the last year; vessels may have less flexibility to adjust their
behavior in response to changes in regulations specific to gillnets
if they fish the gear exclusively (GGE = 1), and therefore more
likely to comply.
Fishermen that perceive low detection probabilities may
consider this factor in their compliance decision. NMFS observer
data are used to identify pinger violations in order to assess
compliance rates for management. We consider the idea
that NMFS observers can be a substitute or complement to
enforcement. That is, does the presence of an observer deter non-
compliant behavior similar to an enforcement agent? We include
a detection variable that captures the vessel’s history of being
observed over several years to test whether being observed in
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previous year’s influences their compliance in the current year. A
person may be compliant whether an observer has been on board
or not. Specifically, the detection variable is positive (DETECT
= 1) if a NMFS observer was aboard the vessel while fishing in
pinger areas, at least once in each of the previous two fishing years
(May 2007–April 2009). Vessels can be observed more than once
within a year. However, by adding the additional requirement
of sampling two consecutive years for our deterrent variable
(DETECT), we test whether consistent annual observer sampling
of a vessel influences their compliance behavior.
The normative variables considered take account of both
intrinsic and extrinsic values that may influence behavioral
outcomes, such as a compliance decision. Our assumption
regarding these factors is lower moral values for example, are
associated with lower compliance rates while higher values with
higher compliance. We construct proxy variables using existing
data due to a lack of direct observable data (e.g., interview survey
data) for these factors. We assume a vessel’s previous violation
history captures the decision maker’s moral behavior. That is,
persons with a history of repeat violations are associated with
lower moral values compared to persons with no violations; some
individuals follow the law nomatter what. The variable recording
the vessel’s violation history is positive (V_OLD=1), if the vessel
has two (2) or more observed pinger violations in the previous
2 years; a violation did not have to occur in consecutive years.
We therefore examine whether vessels that have a violation in the
current year are more likely to have violated in previous years.
Individuals with two or more violations (V_OLD=1) observed
in two consecutive years (DETECT=1), may be lackadaisical or
casual about regulations, may have low moral standards, but are
classified as repeat violators.
Social influences can affect compliance decisions. An
individual may feel compelled to not comply with regulations
if others are not complying. There were no apparent groupings
of sink gillnet vessels fishing with pingers at the time of this
study in any particular area. Nonetheless, vessels fishing from
the same port of landing are likely to have more opportunities
to communicate about prices, regulations etc., compared to
vessels fishing in different ports. As a consequence we attempt
to understand this factor by including a proxy social variable;
we include a “port behavior” variable which indicates whether
another vessel in an individual’s landing port also had a pinger
violation (PBEHAV = 1). Specifically, our model tests whether
port effects are present; are vessels more likely to not comply if
other vessels in their port do not comply as well? Vessels landing
in multiple ports were assigned to their highest revenue port.
Our proxy legitimacy variable tests whether a fishermen’s
involvement in the management process influences compliance
with regulations. Specifically, we determine the decision maker’s
affiliation with a HPTRP team member within their port;
members include gillnet fishermen from Maine to Rhode Island,
though members are not in every port. A fisherman having
direct access to a TRT member may allow information sharing,
cooperation, and potential collaboration with the development of
the HPTRP.We test whether a fishermen is more likely to comply
if they have an active TRTmember in their port (TRT = 1) or not
(TRT = 0).
Many factors can enter an individual’s decision process. We
develop proxy normative factors in the absence of a formal
compliance survey. Our intent is to investigate alternative
normative factors in addition to the expected economic factors
that influence a person’s decision. This may lead us to consider
developing a more formal compliance survey in the future.
DATA
Model Data
Pinger violations, non-compliance, are observed and calculated
by using data from the NEFOP, the only available data source
to estimate compliance rates. Several data bases are used to
build our compliance model data set. The Northeast Commercial
Fisheries database and the Northeast Vessel Tracking and
Reporting database were used to estimate a vessel’s gross revenue
(GREV) and number of different gears types used within a fishing
year (GGE). The NMFS Northeast Regional Office’s (NERO)
Vessel Permit database identifies a vessel’s characteristics such as
horse power, length and gross tons.
The first step involves identifying all observed gillnet vessels
fishing in pinger regulated season-areas during our current
fishing year, June 2009 through May 2010. The NEFOP observed
52% of the gillnet vessels fishing in areas that require pingers
during the current year. Using this unique observed vessel list,
we track each vessel from June 2007 to May 2009, two previous
fishing years, to calculate a vessel’s violation and detection
history. Several different databases are accessed over the study
period to construct our set of independent variables (Table 1)
to identify statistically a set of factors that may explain a vessel’s
compliance behavior in the current year (dependent variable).
During the current fishing year (2009-2010), 248 gillnet vessels
took 15,022 trips north of the 40 degree latitude line, earning
revenues of $45.6 million dollars. Of these, 107 vessels (43%)
fished in areas that required pingers and earned revenues of $8.3
million in pinger managed areas (18% of the total revenue earned
by all 248 active gillnet vessels). The NEFOP observed 56 gillnet
vessels that had the same operator during the entire study period
(2007–2010); this is important because our independent variables
include fishing history. We assume the individual making the
TABLE 1 | Description of independent variables.
Variable Description
CYRS Number of captain years fishing
HPLEN Ratio of engine horsepower to vessel length
GREV Gross revenues of vessel in the previous year (in $1000)
GTONS Gross tons
DETECT Perceived probability of detection
(observed in each previous 2 years at least once = 1; else = 0)
GGE Fish gillnet gear exclusively yes = 1; no = 0
V_OLD Previous violations
(at least 2 observed violations in the previous 2 years =1; else = 0)
PBEHAV Port Behavior of other vessels (yes, others violated = 1; no = 0)
TRT TRT member belonged to this port? (yes = 1; no = 0)
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compliance decision is the vessel operator; therefore our sample
consists of vessels that have the same decision maker (operator or
captain) over the entire study period. Our data and model results
therefore represents 52% (=56/107 vessels) of the fleet fishing
with pingers during our study period.
Focus Group Data
Following the completion of this model, researchers held several
focus group meetings with the objective of ground-truthing the
compliancemodel results reported in this paper. NOAA Fisheries
(NMFS) frequently uses qualitative research such as focus
groups and cognitive interviews to facilitate the development of
survey instruments. This qualitative research was conducted in
facilities that allow observations of the discussion or interview
and provide a professional atmosphere for the research. Four
focus group sessions with 15 invited gillnet fishermen from
Rhode Island to Maine participated (Bisack and Clay, 2012)
during the week of 4–8 March 2012. Focus group sessions
were facilitated by the researchers. We share some preliminary
findings regarding fishermen’s perceptions in our discussion
section to interpret some of our statistical model findings that
follow. Invited fishermen were asked to express their opinions on
several normative factors considered here and about regulations
in general. Some selected comments by the participants are
presented in the appendix. Our model results are based on 2007
to 2010 data and though the focus group meetings were held
2 years after these period, selected comments are robust and
independent of the time delay.
RESULTS
During the 2009–2010 fishing year there was at least 1 observed
violation on 66% of the vessels (=39/56 vessels) and on 51% of
the observed trips in our sample. On average, observed vessels
fishing in pinger management areas weighed 21 tons, had a
measure of 8 horse power units per vessel foot, earned $228,325
in annual revenues and had captains with 24 years of experience
in gillnetting (Table 2). Data indicate 79% of the vessels used
gillnet gear exclusively. Based on their 2 year history, 48%
had an observer on-board their vessel for 2 consecutive years
while fishing in pinger areas. Previous violations were present
for 55% of the vessels, our moral proxy variable. Our proxy
legitimacy and social influence variables indicate 38% of the
vessel operators were affiliated with a local TRT member in their
port, and 54% resided in a landing port where other vessels had a
violation.
Table 3 reports the estimated probit coefficients (estimated
with SEs) for the incidence of non-compliance, violations, with
pinger regulations among vessels. The log-likelihood test rejects
the zero-coefficient hypothesis implying that the model fits the
data well (p < 0.0001). The percentage of outcomes correctly
predicted is 92% based on the model estimates. This suggests
an overall good fit of the model. All variables, except the port
behavior (PBEHAVE) and TRT, were significant at 95% level
or higher (Table 3). Marginal effects were calculated at the
individual observation and then averaged over the sample. The
marginal effects show a particularly strong influence on VIOL
TABLE 2 | Summary statistics and frequency distribution of the
independent variables.
Continuous variables Mean Standard deviation Min Max
CYRS 24 10 3 45
HPLEN 7.98 2.14 4.6 13.81
GREV ($1000) 228.33 124.23 17.57 644.69
GTONS 20.89 10.15 4.00 65.00
Dummy variables Frequency Percent
VIOL 39 66.10
DETECT 27 48.21
GGE 44 78.57
V_OLD 31 55.36
PBEHAV 30 53.57
TRT 21 37.50
No. Observations:56.
TABLE 3 | Factors of a vessel’s decision to violate pinger regulations.
Variable Coefficient estimates Marginal effects*100
INTERCEPT 8.62 (2.46)*** –
CYRS 0.08 (2.36)** 1.22
HPLEN −1.31 (3.00)*** −18.74
GTONS 0.09 (2.44)** 1.30
DETECT −2.55 (−2.39)** −36.43
GREV 0.01 (2.03)** 0.14
GGE −5.14 (2.02)*** −73.55
V_OLD 3.11 (2.87)*** 44.45
PBEHAV 1.42 (1.31) 20.32
TRT −0.61 (−0.60) −8.72
Log Likelihood −14.59
Zero-slope chi-square (9 df) 42.59 (p < 0.0001)
Percent correctly predicted 92.3%
No. Observations 56
The t-statistics based on SEs are in parentheses. Marginal effects, predicted probabilities,
are evaluated at the individual observation and then averaged over the sample. *** and
** indicate significance at 1% and 5% level, respectively. Variance inflation indices and
correlation checks indicate multi-collinearity was not present.
in the estimated model for some variables such as DETECT and
GGE.
The deterrent factor DETECT was inversely related with the
probability of a violation, suggesting a higher expectation of
being observed will lead to fewer violations. Individuals observed
in previous years were on average 36% less likely to violate the
pinger regulation. The sign of GGE indicates vessels that fish
multiple gears, or vessels that do not fish gillnet exclusively,
are more likely to violate. The marginal effect for this variable
is 74%.
Among the vessel characteristics, those with lower horse
power per feet (HPLEN), or under powered vessels, are more
likely to violate; this variable has the largest marginal effects
among the set of vessel characteristic variables Results also
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indicate vessels that hadmore experienced captains (CYRS), were
heavier (GTONS) and earned higher revenues (GREV) are more
likely to violate. However, the magnitudes of these impacts are
low; the marginal effects are close to 1%.
Among the normative variables, vessels with a history
of violations, our moral variable (V_OLD), have a positive
significant relation. Individuals who violated previously are, on
average, 45% more likely to violate in the current year. This
implies a large number of vessels are, in fact, repeat violators.
Vessels are more likely to violate if they did not have a NMFS
observer on board in the previous 2 years and they have a
history of violations. While the social and legitimacy variables,
port behavior (PBEHAV) and TRT, both have expected signs for
their parameter estimates, they are statistically insignificant. The
sign for the port behavior (PBEHAV) coefficient may suggest
the compliance decision of the vessel operator tends to be
positively related to the compliance decision of the other port
members. The negative sign for the TRT coefficient proposes that
fishermen’s involvement in the development of the TRT planmay
lead to lower violations.
In summary, our model estimates suggests, vessels more likely
to violate the 1998 TRT harbor porpoise pinger regulations are
characterized by lower horse power per foot, higher gross tons,
multiple gear use, a positive violation history, and were not
carrying a NMFS observer in the previous 2 years while fishing
in pinger management areas.
DISCUSSION
Policy planning requires a sound understanding of compliance
behavior to achieve successful regulatory goals. Commercial
fishing gear standards along with closures are the typical
regulatory instruments chosen to reduce the take of protected
species such as marine mammals to PBR goals; however, pinger
regulations, for example, are successful only if there is a high level
of compliance. In 2007, non-compliance was one of the primary
reasons the TRT reconvened when the porpoise bycatch levels
exceeded PBR; compliance was not addressed in the 1999 HPTRP
development. NMFS works with various partners, including
NOAA’s OLE, the U.S. Coast Guard, and individual states to
monitor compliance and enforce regulatory components of the
HPTRP; this includes coordinating special operations patrols
to conduct more focused at-sea monitoring and enforcement
of HPTRP requirements (NMFS, 2010). Becker’s (1968) basic
deterrence framework assumes detection probabilities and fines
can be set to improve compliance with regulations; however,
requests for more enforcement and higher penalties may not
be cost-effective for monitoring pinger gear compliance and
though observers record violations in NEFOP, they are not
enforcement agents. Subsequently low detection rates can lead
to an extremely low probability of being caught and prosecuted;
hence, the economic incentive for pinger non-compliance is
high. We need to strengthen and expand our compliance
framework; HPTRP compliance measures continue to rely
primarily on NMFS observer data. Enforcement may not be
the only remedy to curb the compliance problem; the observer
program may be a substitute or a complement for enforcement.
However, our intent in this paper is to understand what
factors may influence a fisherman to comply in the absence of
incentives.
We follow Sutinen’s seminal work along with others and
consider normative, economic and perceived detection variables
to explain compliance behavior with pinger regulations in the
northeast sink gillnet fishery to shed light on other approaches
we can pursue to improve compliance with gear standards. Using
a probit framework we incorporate economic and normative
factors to examine compliance behavior of fishermen with regard
to pinger regulations. Results indicate a fisherman who had a
history of violations, a low detection rate the previous year, and
were characterized as high revenue earners fishing multiple gears
were more likely to be non-compliant with pinger regulations.
High revenue earners fishing multiple gears may be associated
with more capital and hence willing to take more risks with
violation consequences.
To ground-truth these model results focus group discussions
were held with fishermen using pingers who reside in
Connecticut to Maine ports. We weave some preliminary focus
group findings about fishermen’s perceptions of the normative
factors considered in this paper. Participant’s views support
our model hypothesis and findings. In general, fishermen
believed pingers deter harbor porpoise; however, they agreed
the economic incentive to comply is absent (Appendix in
Supplementary Material, comment 2).
Compliance model results suggest vessels more likely to
violate pinger regulations had lower detection rates by NMFS
observers. Our deterrent variable DETECT, may indicate the
presence of NMFS observers have an influence on compliance
decisions. Some focus group participants stated 40% of their 2012
trips were being observed and therefore “non-compliance was
not an option.” However, they also discussed among themselves
who the “bad apples” are and stated the coast guard knows them
as well (Appendix in Supplementary Material, comment 3). They
went on to share their perception of how these “bad apples” make
their decisions; “you can land flounder revenues of “$4000 and
yourMMPA fine is $500, you break the law every day” (Appendix
in Supplementary Material, comment 4). Participant’s sense or
believe the chance of getting caught is low, and if you do get
caught, the fines are acceptable.
Violators may often be repeat offenders. We assume a vessel’s
violation history captures their moral behavior. Our model
results show vessels more likely to violate pinger regulations
had a history of violations. Fishermen’s statements during
the focus group meeting echoed King and Sutinen’s (2010)
findings that most fishermen comply, and within a typical
population, there is a small core subgroup that tends to violate
routinely (Appendix in Supplementary Material, comment 7–
8). Participants talked about “Smart Compliance” in general
which recommends different types of enforcement strategies
and penalties for different groups of fishermen based on their
compliance history (King and Sutinen, 2010); specifically, more
aggressive targeting of frequent violators and for certain types
of violations, criminal penalties and the forfeiture of all fishing
privileges should be considered. Participants recognize the need
to increase the penalties.
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The presence of a TRT member in a vessel’s residing port
was not statistically related to their recorded pinger violations.
The social science literature asserts we should see improved
levels of compliance when individuals have more opportunity
to participate in the design and discussion of regulations. We
suggested a fishermen’s involvement in the development of
the HPTRP via a TRT member residing in their port, may
lead to lower violations. However, the statistically insignificant
finding is consistent with focus group participants’ comments.
Frankly, only a third of the participants knew who their
TRT representative was and some of these participants had
that knowledge because they in fact, were members of the
2007 harbor porpoise TRT and participated at TRT meetings.
Meetings are infrequent; the TRT met in 1998 and then nine
(9) years later in 2007 when bycatch levels exceeded PBR.
An increase in face-to-face communication could improve
compliance behavior.
The proxy social (PBEHAV) variable was not statistically
significant; we tested whether other vessels in the same port
had violations or not. Focus group participants stated fairly
strongly, that their decision to comply is not influenced by other’s
behavior (PBEHAV) (Appendix in Supplementary Material,
comment 6). Why would we be expected to know other people’s
behavior? It was clear fishermen may have an impractical
assessment of their peer’s behavior. A participant made the
following comment when asked whether they know who is and
is not complying with the pinger regulations: “So I mean our
gillnet fleet I think is, (long pause), I know he’s a complier
(pointing to another participant)” (Appendix in Supplementary
Material, comment 5). The response was not surprising. Gillnet
vessels reside in approximately 22 different ports along a
large New England coastline from Maine to Connecticut; they
describe their day-to-day fishing operations as a somewhat
solitary existence. Given that fishermen are in short supply
of face-to-face TRT meetings to discuss MMPA regulations
and have a limited awareness of their peer’s compliance; these
environmental conditions may possibly provide an explanation
of the insignificant finding for our legitimacy and social proxy
variables.
Models and data in general are not flawless; we do not
have perfect information and consequently, shortcomings and
potential biases exist. We followed Hatcher’s et al. (2000)
compliance model with some adaptations. First, though a
penalty structure was present in the sense that MMPA
fines exist, only one recorded pinger violation has been
prosecuted with a resulting fine. For that reason we could
not investigate Becker’s original crime model relationships;
that is, empirically estimate whether the expected illegal gain
exceeds the penalty. Second, while Hatcher et al. (2000)
relied on face-to-face interview survey data to investigate
normative factors, our model relies on historical data recorded
by NMFS observers. Our model data are based on recorded
observations vs. an individual’s perception of their history. Using
both data types, interview surveys and NMFS observed data,
may improve our ability to understand compliance behavior.
For example, comparing differences between an individual’s
“actual” vs. “perceived” history of violations may uncover
whether an individual’s awareness of their own compliance
behavior is accurate. Third, while the non-significance of
the social and legitimacy proxy variables to some extent
was expected, including these variables sheds light on the
importance these factors can have on compliance decisions. In
contrast, our moral variable was significant. While anecdotal,
the hot topic with focus groups participants was “repeat
violators”; everyone knows who the repeat violators are including
enforcement.
Responses from focus group participant seem to authenticate
our normative variable findings and these variables remain in our
study with a long term goal of improving these data in future
research. Finally, the appropriateness of using observer data was
raised; there is a perception that vessels may be forewarned
and repair broken pingers prior to a NMFS observer boarding
a vessel for official data recording. If this were the case, the
observed violation rate would be negatively biased; however, we
are researching factors that may influence compliance decision
and not the compliance rate itself.
Our research findings will hopefully provide resource
managers some valuable knowledge and insights to include
while developing regulations. Observers could simply inform
vessel owners that OLE does access their records. Thus, NMFS’s
observer program can complement or supplement enforcement.
With that mind, increasing or balancing observer coverage in low
sampling areas could result in high compliance returns; under
sampling can induce non-compliant behavior. Alternatively, only
vessels fishing gillnets exclusively be allowed to fish in pinger
areas, was suggested by an anonymous reviewer. In addition,
increasing observer presence which collects multi-disciplined
research data simultaneously is likely more cost-effective than
increasing enforcement levels in-order to conduct at-sea gear
compliance checks for a single species. Second, profile and
target repeat violators for compliance inspections. This may
induce a sense of fairness among fishermen which may also
lead to improved compliance. While these findings are not
a surprise, the validation thru a formal model may provide
enough scientific support to turn these recommendations into
management actions.
Consequential closures, entire fishing areas would be closed
for several months and years, threatening a vessel’s livelihood if
non-compliance exceeded a benchmark porpoise bycatch rate for
two consecutive years in pinger management areas (75 Federal
Register 7383, 19 February 2010). This incentive in the form of
a “threat” was not implemented during this study (2007–2010)
but immediately after in May 2010. Approximately half of the
gillnet fleet started operating under sector management in the
northeast groundfish fishery in May 2010 simultaneously. Future
research will investigate pinger compliance under a new incentive
structure, consequential closures and sector management. We
anticipate these new data, along with additional focus group
socio-economic research data, will enrich our model. Our
results are not conclusive but deserve more attention. We
anticipate this research can help us understand the internal
motivation embedded in the compliance decision of the
individual being regulated, ultimately leading to more successful
regulations.
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